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Abstract 
Water is a crucial commodity, especially in the aftermath of disaster events.  Healthcare 
facilities, such as hospitals, require a water supply for both every day and emergency 
processes.  As required by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO), healthcare facilities must stock a sufficient amount of water for 
medical services following disaster events.  The purpose of this research is to explore the 
capabilities of healthcare facilities regarding the water supply for emergency purposes.  
The study investigated the usage and preparedness trends of water supply in two hospitals 
in Southeast Louisiana.  The hospitals selected for research allowed for comparing and 
contrasting of the capabilities of hospitals located in urban versus rural environments.  
The study identifies key issues and trends in the emergency water supply systems at the 
two hospitals.  Common themes identified include the disparity of needs between the 
hospitals in their respective environments, an adaptive capacity in addressing emergency 
preparedness, and the need for spontaneous improvisation during crisis.  The research 
also identifies future research opportunities, such as improved recommendations of 
salient rationing of resources and increasing use of cost-benefit reservoirs or water 
acquisition means.  The improvement of the emergency water supply capability can be 
improved through collaboration with local emergency preparedness organizations, 
construction of water towers on or near hospital grounds, and the use of synergetic water 
reservoir capacity. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In the aftermath of a disaster, emergency supplies are necessary for many 
purposes.  Water is one of the most basic essential commodities and is often in emergent 
needs in the timeframe immediately following a disaster.  The supply of clean drinking 
water is pertinent to maintain hydration and to provide for adequate sanitation processes 
(Noji, 2005a).  As water is usually provided by municipal suppliers, it may be absent as a 
result of damage to critical transportation infrastructure or storage facilities. 
Hospitals are an important component of the community.  Hospitals provide life-
saving medical services and a considerable amount of employment opportunities 
(Mandich & Dorfman, 2014; Zimmerman, Nicogossian, & Stewart, 2005).  Healthcare 
facilities cannot provide adequate services without a clean water supply.  A hospital 
closure necessitated by the disruption of water supply can place the community in the 
unenviable position of being without a clean water supply, access to medical services, as 
well as a large provider of employment.   
Clean water is of vital importance for the health care systems in everyday 
situations.  Healthcare facilities such as hospitals must have appropriate resources to 
maintain normal operations.  Water is needed for a variety of purposes in healthcare 
facilities, including food and drink, sanitation, sterilization, a variety of medical 
procedures (e.g., dialysis, wound cleaning), electrical generation, ventilation, sewage 
systems, and more.  Hospital operations would be negatively affected if any one of these 
processes was compromised, possibly leading to the rationing of services and the closure 
of facilities. 
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Clean water serves a critical role in the response and recovery following extreme 
events.  In the response phase, water is an indispensable resource for the treatment of 
traumatic injuries or other complications arising from a disaster.  The occurrence of 
disruption of the water supply in such extreme events is rare but debilitating when it does 
occur (Sternberg, 2003).  Research literature suggests that failure of traditional water 
supply for healthcare facilities is usually a result of an external disaster (Sternberg, 2003).  
In the response and recovery phases, water is an integral resource for providing medical 
care (Zimmerman et al., 2005).  Thus, water is critically needed for long-term medical 
care of injuries and illnesses in the aftermath of disaster. 
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO) oversees emergency water supplies for healthcare facilities.  The JCAHO 
recommends a two to three-day (48-72 hours) supply of resources to maintain critical 
hospital functions in the event of an emergency (JCAHO, 2003).  Welter, Bieber, 
Bonnaffon, Deguida, and Socher (2010) reported that a high proportion of the water 
supply is generally maintained in bottled form.  The needs for water within hospitals are 
more diverse than strictly drinking water.  Hick, Barbera, & Kelen (2009) advised 
increasing the amount of water in reserve to compensate for inadequate resources.  
Bottled water presents an ephemeral supply and should not be used to satisfy all water 
needs of a healthcare facility.   
Several studies have reported poor preparedness and under-funding of disaster 
preparedness in healthcare facilities (Cherry & Tranier, 2008; DeLorenzo, 2007; Kaji & 
Lewis, 2006; Richter, 1997; Zimmerman et al., 2005).  Deficiency of the emergency 
water supply can inhibit the disaster preparedness of hospitals, especially during 
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catastrophic situations.  Welter et al. (2010) stated, “The 2.5-day supply number has been 
based solely on bottled water stockpiles intended strictly for drinking.” (p. 70). As such, 
hospitals often maintain emergency water supply in bottled form.  
Maintaining water supplies through bottled water is not necessarily cost-effective.  
Bottled water must be used or discarded by the expiration date.  The storage of bottled 
water is problematic due to the effects of stagnation.  Preventing bacterial growth is a 
primary concern for the water supply of healthcare facilities as they are providing 
medical care for an especially vulnerable population (Casini et al., 2014).  Water storage 
is further complicated by the enormous amount of water necessary to maintain operations 
at healthcare facilities when a disruption to the traditional water supply occurs.  
Maintaining emergency water supplies with bottled water may not be practical for 
continuity of operations for all critical services in healthcare facilities.  Bottled water 
supplies are not practical for use in fire prevention systems, the cooling of ventilation 
systems, many medical procedures, and other pertinent hospital functions.  
Without continuous water supply, healthcare facilities must begin to consider 
rationing of resources and services.  Previous instances of water supply failure 
significantly affected the course of evacuation, once the water supply was compromised 
and could not be immediately restored (Distefano, Graf, Lowry, & Sitler, 2006; Nates, 
2004; Schultz, Koenig, & Lewis, 2003).  The decision to evacuate is unfortunate, as times 
of disaster often create increased demand for the medical services that hospitals provide. 
Purpose Statement 
What are the exact needs and capabilities of healthcare facilities regarding water 
supply for use in emergency events?  The purpose of this research is to explore the 
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capabilities of healthcare facilities regarding the water supply for emergency 
management.  The goal of this thesis is to expand the knowledge base to provide an 
understanding of future research needs for the emergency water supply of healthcare 
facilities.  This research project focuses on hospitals in Southeast Louisiana.  This study 
employed a mixed method design with a focus on the qualitative portion.  This approach 
allowed for the identification of common themes in the healthcare system.  This research 
is intended to contribute to future emergency water supply planning of healthcare 
facilities and related industries.  
Summary 
Natural and man-made disasters often create chaotic moments in the timeframe 
following devastating events.  Many decisions occur in the heat of the moment, though 
spontaneous planning can be limited by careful preparation.  Decisions made prior to 
disaster events can be very influential.  Resources need to be optimally placed to address 
the needs of the community for emergency management purposes.  An essential 
component of emergency management entails protecting vulnerable members of the 
population.  
Healthcare facilities are often responsible for caring for the most vulnerable of the 
community.  However, hospitals are unable to function following a disaster if they are not 
prepared with adequate staff and resources.  Adherence to emergency preparedness 
guidelines is imperative and hospitals must recognize the full extent of needs throughout 
the facility.  Storage of large amounts of water needed to continue services throughout 
healthcare facilities may contrast with the normal logistical procedures used to supply the 
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facility on a day-to-day basis.  A greater understanding of the needs and capabilities of 
hospitals along with productive community planning will produce more salient outcomes. 
This thesis is presented in five sections.  Following this introduction section, a 
detailed literature review considers the effects of disruption to water supplies for 
healthcare facilities.  A methodology section details the rationale for the research 
instrument.  The results section explains the findings.  Finally, I discuss my findings, the 
need for comprehensive emergency preparedness in healthcare facilities, and suggestions 
for future practical applications and research.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Water is a crucial commodity in the aftermath of disasters, especially in 
healthcare facilities.  Many hospital functions rely on a clean water supply.  Pertinent 
hospital functions include life-saving procedures as well as routine services.  
Unfortunately, many hospitals are not prepared for catastrophic events, especially in 
regards to the emergency water supply (Zimmerman et al., 2005).  A lack of adequate 
water reserves could easily lead to dire circumstances, eventually necessitating hospital 
evacuation. 
One of the most important functions of emergency management is providing 
adequate supplies in time of disaster: food and water being crucial commodities.  Storing 
and maintaining food and water is a difficult task for emergency managers.  The focus of 
this review is to recognize previous instances of interruption of medical services related 
to water supply disruption, identify the broad range of water needs for healthcare 
facilities, and understand mitigation and preparedness measures that are considered 
common practice among healthcare facilities in the United States.  
This literature review is organized into four sections: (1) a brief review of 
emergency management principles and risk management for healthcare facilities, (2) 
examples and consequences of water supply interruption, (3) needs and uses of water in 
healthcare facilities, followed by (4) a general review of hospital preparedness.  A 
combination of academic databases was utilized to complete the literature review 
including Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, and ProQuest.  The literature search included a 
mix of key terms, including: “hospital,” “healthcare facilities,” “water supply,” “(critical) 
infrastructure,” “logistics (management),” interruption, disruption, “evacuation,” risk
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management, emergency response, preparedness.  Specific areas of hospital functions 
were searched using terms such as “dialysis,” “ventilation,” “excreta,” and “sanitation.”  
Existing water storage capabilities terms were also included: “bottled water,” 
“expiration,” “PET properties,” “microorganisms,” and “reservoirs.”  Research from all 
dates was considered, with an emphasis on research published after 2001. 
Hospital Disaster Preparedness 
Emergency management of disaster events involves many different components.  
The four major phases of emergency management are mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery (Phillips, Neal, & Webb, 2012).  The US Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) describes mitigation as 
measures meant to limit damage and harm through analysis, insurance, or risk reduction 
actions (FEMA, 2017).  Preparedness includes actions taken prior to, and in preparation 
of, a disaster that cannot be performed through mitigation (National Governors 
Association, 1979).  Preparedness activities include logistical preparations, emergency 
planning, exercises, and warning systems.  The concept of response includes a broad 
range of activities which occur after a disaster.  The overall goal of recovery in 
emergency management following a disaster is to restore affected communities to their 
initial state or an improved community. 
Far too often, first-hand accounts of disaster survivors describe horrific scenes.  
Traumatic injuries and public health issues can quickly become concerning, 
overwhelming, or detrimental.  Healthcare facilities provide one the most crucial aspects 
of infrastructure in the local community where the disaster occurs.  As such, citizens 
expect the medical community to understand its role and prepare appropriately to 
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maintain medical services during times of crisis (Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991).  There 
is a substantial amount of literature available recognizing the need for emergency 
preparedness in healthcare facilities (Cherry & Trainer, 2008; Kaji & Lewis, 2006; 
Richter, 1997; & Zimmerman et al., 2005).  
Past research focused on how hospitals organize logistically for catastrophic 
situations (Cherry & Trainer, 2008; Hick et al., 2009; Schultz & Koenig, 2006; 
VanVactor, 2011; VanVactor, 2012).  Two of these studies considered implications on 
the emergency water supply of healthcare facilities (Hick et al., 2009; Schultz & Koenig, 
2006).  Hick et al. (2009) and Schultz and Koenig (2006) focused on hospital needs 
during crisis events, while peripherally addressing water supply issues.  Both studies 
focused on the overflow of patients in hospital emergency rooms, an issue that called for 
robust logistical supplies, including water resources.  
There are many emergency preparedness processes to consider, especially in 
organizations as complex as healthcare institutions.  Emergency preparedness relevant to 
healthcare facilities occurs internally and externally in the community.  The ability to 
manage a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) is the basis for providing more extensive 
preparedness for disaster situations (Adini et al., 2006).  Current standards recommend 
that healthcare facilities prepare for the possibility of 48-72 hours of stand-alone 
capabilities (JCAHO, 2003).  Local communities are also responsible for emergency 
preparedness and often collaborate with public health resources.   
Community emergency preparedness coalitions or groups often utilize the input of 
a wide variety of interested stakeholders from public health, public safety, educational 
institutions, critical infrastructure, healthcare providers, and public administrators. 
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(JCAHO, 2005).  Local communities commonly address health and medical response in 
their emergency operations plans (Braun et al., 2006).  However, ineffective 
collaboration and coordination between communities and healthcare facilities limit 
effective preparation.  Barriers to comprehensive preparedness include a lack of clarity 
recognizing responsible parties, obfuscation of critical preparedness elements, limited 
coordination with applicable state and federal resources, and the ability to secure and 
sustain funding (JCAHO, 2005).  Rural communities are especially inhibited compared to 
larger, urban providers.  Rural hospitals are generally constrained by fewer resources, 
such as staff and infrastructure, lack of excess capacity, less economic resources, reliance 
on volunteers, geography, and transportation difficulties, among other issues (JCAHO, 
2005).  The wide variety of stakeholders, underdeveloped funding mechanisms, and the 
infrequency of disaster events constrain comprehensive preparedness processes. 
Risk management.  Traditional risk management in healthcare facilities assumes 
an entirely different structure of risk perception than is commonly situated in the context 
of emergency preparedness.  According to Zimmerman et al. (2005), “Risk management 
in the health services is historically related to reducing the impact of medical mistakes 
and managing the liability of accidents and malpractice” (p. 23).  Historical views of risk 
management for healthcare facilities does not address comprehensive emergency 
management for disastrous scenarios which can occur due to unexpected hazardous 
events.  Risk management of medical liability entails a narrow, internal viewpoint.   
Hospitals are subject to vulnerability from internal or external events.  Internal 
disasters include events such as fire, computer malfunction, or water supply failure.  
External vulnerability results from natural or man-made disasters.  Sternberg (2003) 
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defined an internal disaster as any sudden, hazardous event that disrupts normal 
operation.  Sternberg (2003) also recognized a variety of uncertainties can lead to internal 
disasters.  These uncertainties include hazard, incidental, sequential, informational, 
consequential, cascade, organizational, and background issues.  Hazardous uncertainty 
arises from specific threats, such as a natural disaster.  Incidental uncertainty refers to an 
accident that creates a larger threat.  Sequential uncertainty occurs due to a series of 
events.  Limited, excessive, or questionable information leads to confusion and 
informational uncertainty.  Consequential uncertainty is that which is unexpected.  
Cascading uncertainty explains how failure in one system may affect other systems.  
Organizational uncertainty can be related to structure or personnel.  Finally, background 
uncertainty refers to unknown external conditions or resources.  With this large variety of 
uncertainties, it is impossible to respond to a specific event with limited resources.  Thus, 
the primary goal of emergency preparedness is to plan for all-hazards by recognizing 
consistent patterns in response.  
The all-hazards approach to emergency management is relevant to emergency 
preparedness in healthcare facilities.  The all-hazards approach recognizes similarities 
among different types of disaster events (Phillips et al., 2012).  Several studies have 
documented an increase in patients following a disaster, combined with staffing shortages 
(Bolut, Fedekar, Akkose, Ozguc, & Tokyay, 2005; Hick et al., 2009; Schultz & Koenig, 
2006).  Surge capacity is a term used to describe additional patient loads, which often 
occurs in the aftermath of catastrophic events.  Surge capacity is defined as additional 
resource demand in relation to routine needs (Kelen & McCarthy, 2006).  Kelen and 
McCarthy (2006) further explained surge capacity as the maximum amount of resources 
11 
 
 
 
that can be delivered and utilized.  Kelen and McCarthy’s (2006) description of surge 
capacity relates to a broad array of institutions that may be faced with increased demand 
in relation to available resources.  Schultz and Koenig (2006) provided a description of 
surge capacity specific to healthcare organizations recognizing the requirements needed 
for treatment of sudden, unforeseen increases in patient volumes.  In general, the 
resources needed to treat specific volumes of patients are constant.  In a surge situation, 
the necessary resources are increased due to unexpected and excessive demand. 
Various benchmarks describe surge capacity preparation.  In Israel, hospital’s 
emergency operation plans are expected to address twenty percent higher volumes over 
average patient census during crisis situations (Schultz & Koenig, 2006).  In the U.S., the 
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) recommended the ability to treat 
between fifty and five hundred more patients for every 1,000,000 in population, 
depending on various scenarios, such as natural hazards or pandemics (HRSA, 2005).  
Increased patient loads have been noted between twenty-four and forty-eight hours 
following disaster events (Bolut et al., 2005).  Bayram et al. (2013) utilized focus groups 
of hospital staff and administrators to identify resources pertinent to medical care during 
surge capacity.  The research found increased need for a variety of necessary medical 
supplies during surge events.  Prominent resources needed included copious amounts of 
intravenous fluids, along with lesser need for dialysate and sterile water (Bayram et al., 
2013).  The focus groups primarily focused on medical supplies, and results did not 
reflect the importance of critical infrastructure or essential commodities such as food and 
water.   
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Schultz and Koenig (2006) advised that emergency preparedness in healthcare 
facilities is best performed with suitable staff, supplies, structure, and systems 
management.  This combination of components was termed the 4S standard by the 
authors.  Staff must be both adequate in number and prepared to successfully complete 
goals.  Supplies need to be sufficient to maintain operations throughout the emergency 
timeframe.  The structure of the building must be stable, remaining intact throughout a 
disaster.  Finally, the management structure must be prepared and organized sufficiently 
to provide effective leadership throughout a crisis situation.  Schultz and Koenig (2006) 
reported that hospitals are constrained by governmental regulations, hospital standards, 
and internal policies.  The hospital is vulnerable if any of the four components are 
compromised. 
Supplies are a crucial component of Schultz and Koenig’s (2006) 4S theory, as 
hospital preparations cannot progress without adequate resources.  Several theories have 
addressed pre-positioning of relief supplies for use in case of disaster (Rawls & 
Turnquist, 2010; Van Wyck, Bean, & Yadavalli, 2011; Van Wyck & Yadavalli, 2011).  
Recent work based on computer modeling and focus on distribution.  Rawls and 
Turnquist (2010) presented a mixed-integer computer algorithm for ideal placement of 
disaster relief supplies.  Van Wyck and Yadavalli (2011) produced a computer algorithm 
model to address the preparation of relief supplies.  A subsequent study by Van Wyck et 
al. (2011) refined the algorithm by adding a cost analysis function.  However, these 
studies (Rawls & Turnquist, 2010; Van Wyck et al., 2011; Van Wyck & Yadavalli, 2011) 
did not address healthcare facility needs or specifically consider positioning supplies at or 
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near hospitals, refugee camps, or where the population is likely to congregate in the 
aftermath of a disaster.  
Other studies have focused on the delivery of relief supplies, such as how to best 
deliver water in the aftermath of disasters based on computer algorithms, with up-to-date 
data regarding transportation delays or route closures (Nolz, Doerner, & Hartl, 2010; 
Nolz, Semet, & Doerner, 2011).  These studies emphasized transportation alternatives in 
the routing of relief supplies in the aftermath of disasters. 
Little information is available regarding logistical management of supplies needed 
in crisis situations in healthcare facilities.  There are four categories of inventory in 
healthcare facilities: cyclic, seasonal, safety and contingency (VanVactor, 2011).  Cyclic 
inventory refers to items in stock that are constantly used and rotated. Seasonal inventory 
is added due to expected increases in demand during certain timeframes.  An example of 
seasonal inventory includes additional heat packs that may be needed in winter months.  
Safety inventory includes commonly used items overstocked to surplus levels, but still 
needed on a routine basis.  Contingency inventory includes rarely used items necessary 
for certain rare situations (e.g., anti-venom).  An emerging trend in hospital supply has 
been through Just-In-Time (JIT) logistics (Cherry & Trainer, 2008; VanVactor, 2012).  
JIT creates efficiency through the delivery of supplies on an as-needed basis.  The JIT 
theory contrasts with the tenets of emergency preparedness where relief supplies are 
stored until needed.  
Auditing tools are used to determine water supply needs of healthcare facilities. 
Routine water supply needs can be calculated by average daily sewerage rates.  Several 
auditing tools are available to help healthcare organizations understand risks, needs, and 
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capabilities.  Commonly used auditing software programs are available through the 
American Society of Healthcare Engineers (ASHE), Kaiser Permanente, and HCPro, Inc. 
(Campbell, Trockman, & Walker, 2011).  Auditing tools can be very useful, especially if 
facilities make appropriate adjustments to problem areas.  However, “Too many of our 
nation’s hospitals have become complacent over disaster preparedness. They develop a 
document to meet a licensure requirement of a Joint Commission of Healthcare 
Organizations standard” (Richter, 1997, p. 1).  Richter stated these sentiments nearly 
twenty years ago and there is not much reason to believe that the culture of emergency 
preparedness in healthcare facilities has completely changed since.  A more recent study 
reported the 48 to 72-hour threshold is being prepared for primarily with bottled water 
intended solely for drinking purposes (Welter et al., 2010).  Thus, for auditing purposes, 
the drinking water needs throughout healthcare facilities are the primary consideration.  
However, the true water needs of healthcare facilities are much more diverse. 
The process to supply a healthcare facility on a daily basis is complex.  Supply of 
a hospital may be difficult, if not impossible, in the aftermath of disasters.  Conceivably, 
healthcare facilities could request the assistance of federal agencies responding to disaster 
events following a presidential disaster declaration.  Federal relief would be onerous and 
require the assistance of several agencies (Byrne, 2008).  Several regulatory processes 
must be followed for federal agencies to provide disaster relief supplies.  A more robust 
supply stockpile, within the facility, would allow for conventional operations to resume 
for a longer duration (Hick et al., 2009).  Effective preparation through adequate supply 
and redundancy can be vital as hospitals are expected to continue operations without 
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outside support (Arbodela, Abraham, Richard, & Lubitz, 2006).  Water is one of the most 
important relief supplies as healthcare facilities cannot operate without a water supply. 
Lack of preparedness.  In general, hospitals perform emergency preparedness 
functions through exercises and drills.  Exercises and drills allow for staff development of 
organizational structure and additional medical training.  Emergency preparedness, 
through drills and exercises, improves the capabilities of staff members and the 
management system as noted by Schultz and Koenig (2006).  However, preparedness 
drills are expensive, especially when performed with large staffs.  Hospitals may find it 
difficult to provide resources to plan for emergency situations which are uncertain to 
occur in the future.  
Limited numbers of disaster exercises and drills lead to a general lack of 
preparedness in healthcare facilities.  An early study by Waeckerle, in 1991, detailed how 
disasters are sudden and unexpected, thus necessitating more planning for hospitals and 
medical personnel.  Kaji and Lewis (2006) found poor preparedness levels among 
hospitals in Los Angeles, California.  Wise (2006) also noted poor emergency planning 
for healthcare facilities.  The author found better outcomes occurred with enhanced 
planning processes (Wise, 2006).  Preparedness exercises and planning are important, but 
hospitals also require adequate infrastructure to function properly. 
The structure of the hospital building is just as important as the administration, 
equipment, and infrastructure.  Schultz and Koenig (2006) noted the importance of the 
structure to withstand the impact of disaster.  Vulnerability assessments can help to 
pinpoint weak spots and guide preparedness planning.  Two studies have called for 
hospitals to prepare further by providing more in-depth vulnerability assessments 
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(Arbodela et al., 2006; Kuwata & Takada, 2007).  Vulnerability assessments can provide 
increased understanding of protection measures available for specific threats endemic to 
certain geographic locales, such as earthquake or flood zones. 
Instances of Emergency Water Supply Disruption 
There have been multiple instances in which hospitals have had to cope with 
interruption to the emergency water supply.  There were 286 hospital evacuations 
between 1950 and 2005 (Distefano et al., 2006).  Twenty-two of these instances were 
full-hospital evacuations.  It is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of evacuations 
related to water supply disruption.  Past research shows several examples of water supply 
disruption affecting healthcare facilities.  Past examples include the 1993 flood, the 
Northridge Earthquake, Tropical Storm Allison, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, and 
others. 
1993 flood.  The 1993 flood affected the Iowa Methodist Medical Center in July 
1993 when the swollen Des Moines and Raccoon Rivers caused extraordinary flooding in 
Des Moines, Iowa.  The flooding contaminated the municipal water supply, leading to 
water supply interruption for three weeks (Sternberg, 2003).  Hospital employees 
immediately recognized the danger to the water supply and were able to shut off the flow 
of water from the municipal supply.  Closing off the external water supply ensured no 
decontamination occurred within the hospital system.  A review by Ramsey (1994) 
portrays a harrowing and extraordinary tale where the hospital was able to maintain 
operation throughout the ordeal.  Water was supplied to the hospital via tanker trucks and 
5-gallon containers.  The effort to resupply the facility was adequate to provide for 
critical services.  Rationing of water resources was necessary, such as limiting shower 
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usage and laundry services.  A limited number of necessary surgeries were performed and 
autoclave sanitizing was performed with the bottled water.  Bottled water was also used 
for excreta removal via toilet flush.  The hospital remained on partial power due to stand-
by generators requiring water for cooling.  The resupply of water via alternate sources did 
not facilitate usage for the water-cooled generator system.  Eventually, the National 
Guard provided a 50,000-gallon water bladder with water purification occurring within 
the facility.  
Northridge Earthquake.  The Northridge Earthquake occurred in the early 
morning hours of January 17, 1994 in Northridge, California.  The earthquake registered 
6.7 on the Richter scale and caused widespread damage.  The earthquake forced the 
evacuation of eight hospitals (DiStefano et al., 2006).  Two of the hospitals utilized 
partial evacuations and six performed complete evacuations (Schultz et al., 2003).  Five 
of these facilities reported non-structural damage to water supply infrastructure as a 
critical factor in the decision to evacuate.  The affected hospitals recognized that their 
water supply was compromised.  The facilities would also face difficulty enlisting 
assistance from outside agencies due to the scope of damage to the overall region.  Over 
1,000 patients were transferred to alternative facilities throughout this event.  The 
vulnerability of California hospitals persisted as a follow-up report showed 46% of 
hospitals in the region were in danger of structural failure in the event of a similar size 
earthquake.  Additionally, 91% were in danger of non-structural damage of the type that 
caused the majority of evacuations (Schultz et al., 2003). 
Tropical Storm Allison.  Tropical Storm Allison affected Houston, Texas in June 
2001.  Tropical Storm Allison was characterized as an extraordinary rain event leading to 
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extensive flooding in the metropolitan Houston area.  This storm system severely affected 
the Texas Medical Center (TMC), which included thirteen hospitals and two medical 
schools with over 6,000 patients.  Tropical Storm Allison caused $2 billion in damage to 
TMC (Distefano et al., 2006).  Nates (2004) reported how Mount Herman Memorial 
(MHM) became isolated due to loss of electricity, communication, and water supply.  
MHM evacuated their facility and remained closed for thirty-eight days.  The effects of 
Tropical Storm Allison highlighted the importance of protecting electricity, water 
supplies, and other critical infrastructure. 
Hurricane Katrina.  Hurricane Katrina was a Category 4 hurricane that 
significantly affected Mississippi and Southeast Louisiana in August and September of 
2005.  Hurricane Katrina led to the inundation of the majority of the city of New Orleans 
throughout the month of September.  The flooding impacted multiple hospitals in the city 
of New Orleans, leading to an inability to provide medical services at these facilities 
(Klein & Nagel, 2007).  Area hospitals stocked up on additional emergency water 
supplies after advanced warnings were issued and prior to hurricane landfall.  Butcher 
(2006) presented an account of one of the larger hospitals in the region, Charity Hospital 
(CH), located in downtown New Orleans.  CH had 14,000 gallons of water on hand at the 
time of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.  Nonetheless, the duration of events led to a dire 
situation at CH, such as shortages of water for dialysis, personal hygiene, fire-fighting 
capabilities, and waste removal (Brevard et al., 2008).  A review of the circumstances 
that affected the hospitals during Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath calls for further 
risk-based planning and enhancing improvisational abilities (Edwards, 2009).  Hurricane 
Katrina was a defining moment for hospital preparedness and healthcare facilities.  
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Hospitals across the country have since recognized the implications of inadequate 
preparedness (Powell, Hanfling, & Gustin, 2012).  The size and scope of the disaster, the 
number of hospitals impacted, and the extent of the population affected by Hurricane 
Katrina provides an ideal scenario for future planning. 
Hurricane Sandy.  Hurricane Sandy was a Category 3 hurricane that caused 
widespread destruction in New Jersey and New York in November 2012.  The storm left 
widespread flooding in the surrounding regions, affecting hospitals in New York City.  
Two New York City hospitals required evacuation after the fuel pumps used for electrical 
generation were flooded (Redlener & Reilly, 2012).  The flooded fuel pumps were 
located in the basement of these facilities.  A ladder patrol was formed to bring fuel 
directly to the generators.  This effort was unsustainable, leading to the call for the 
evacuation.  Redlener and Reilly (2012) reported that healthcare facilities must do a 
better job of learning from previous disaster experiences and putting knowledge learned 
into future planning.  Although the generators were raised in these facilities, not all the 
infrastructure required for their use was adequately protected. 
Other scenarios.  Hurricane, earthquakes, and other disasters are exceptional 
events.  History tells us that these types of events happen from time to time.  However, it 
does not take a disaster on a grand scale to cause operations at hospitals to be severely 
impacted.  The 1993 flood, the Northridge Earthquake, Tropical Storm Allison, 
Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Sandy are not the only examples of water supply 
disruption affecting hospitals as there are several other similar instances to note. 
The water supply of healthcare facilities can become comprised through a variety 
of means.  Causes of disruption may seem minor at the onset and then grow into a larger 
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problem.  For example, an event occurred in Seattle, WA in 1997 due to a sewer 
blockage (Sternberg, 2003).  The blockage of the sewer line eventually backed-up excreta 
into several departments of the hospital.  The excreta back-up interrupted laboratory and 
radiological services, and caused partial evacuation of the facility (Sternberg, 2003).  
While this is an isolated incident, hospitals across the country could be affected by this 
type of slow-moving scenario. 
More uncommon situations do occur.  Different geographic localities are 
vulnerable to their own specific sets of risks.  Manuel (2014) provides a recent example 
of a man-made disaster impacting healthcare facilities when a chemical spill 
contaminated the Elk River and a municipal water supply in West Virginia.  Local 
hospitals experienced a surge of over 600 patients with related complaints.  Two 
hospitals, Thomas Health System and Charleston Area Medical Center, scrambled to 
locate an adequate clean water supply (Kloc, 2014).  Both hospitals maintained services 
with assistance involving collecting water supplies and rationing laundry services and 
personal hygiene services.  Eventually, a local psychiatric hospital provided laundry 
services via an in-house water-recycling wash system.  A water-recycling laundry service 
is the type of system that helps facilities to remain resilient through challenging 
situations. 
Community members expect healthcare facilities to provide medical services in 
the aftermath of disasters.  Hospitals are a crucial component of a community’s 
infrastructure that provides patient care, as well as being a significant economic driver in 
the community.  However, when a disaster strikes, hospitals remain vulnerable assets.  
The previous examples demonstrated that hospitals are especially vulnerable to flooding, 
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but also to hurricanes, earthquakes, and failure of critical municipal services.  The ability 
to locate alternate water supplies when necessary is valiant, but not an ideal situation.  
Bottled water, truck delivery, and the use of military (often National Guard) or fire 
department equipment is the last resort and provides only minimal amounts of water 
services.  Further, the use of military equipment or fire department resources hinders 
those agencies from completing their primary missions.  Rationing and then evacuation 
of facilities are often the unfortunate and inevitable next steps.  
The dire circumstances of the hospitals in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina 
and the hospitals in California during the Northridge Earthquake illustrate the 
catastrophic situations that can occur within healthcare facilities.  In both instances, 
multiple regional medical centers were affected by water supply failure.  Outside help 
was stretched thin, and the only option available was a mass evacuation.  
Hospital evacuation.  Hospital evacuation challenges comprise an under-
researched area, although this topic has received some attention recently.  Disetfano et al. 
(2006) described both internal and complete (external) evacuations.  Internal evacuations 
are more common scenarios and include horizontal and vertical evacuations.  Horizontal 
evacuations occur along the same level of the facility away from the danger area.  
Vertical evacuations refer to moving patients to another floor of the same hospital.  
Adini, Laor, Cohen, and Israeli (2012) provided an explanation of both internal and 
external evacuations.  Adini et al. (2012) described four types of evacuations: internal 
relocation, evacuation without staff (transfer), full evacuation of patients and staff 
members, and early discharge of patients.  Internal relocation entails the horizontal and 
vertical evacuations described by Distefano et al. (2006).  Evacuation without staff occurs 
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when a hospital transfers a patient to a safe alternate facility, usually via ambulance.  A 
full evacuation of patients and staff members requires transport and the availability of 
alternate facilities.  Early discharge of patients occurs with lower acuity patients that can 
follow-up with outpatient care.  Transferring of patients and early discharges allow for 
opening space which may be needed for additional patients associated with surge 
capacity in the aftermath of disasters. 
Taaffe, Kohl, and Kimbler (2005) explained preliminary decision making for 
when to declare a hospital evacuation.  Their research addressed a combination of factors 
including the risks of evacuation decisions and outcomes, while considering the 
availability of resources and previous training of staff.  Risks and resource demands are 
constantly shifting throughout disaster events.  Taaffee et al. (2005) concluded that more 
detailed research and simulations need to be prepared as well as detailed planning and 
drills to facilitate the execution of mass evacuations 
Evacuation is difficult for patients and staff.  The level of risk to patients of an 
evacuation varies depending upon patient acuity levels (Taaffe et al., 2005).  Evacuation 
can require much more effort than simply putting a patient in a vehicle and moving them.  
Powell et al. (2012) stated, “Evacuation decisions are complex – to evacuate prematurely 
places patients at risk, whereas waiting too long can have devastating consequences” (p. 
E1).  Some patients may require intensive care, such as medication administration, 
ventilation, and other life support equipment.  Acceptable facilities and transportation 
must be located and arranged.  Transportation of patients with high-needs must be 
accomplished by Emergency Medical Services (EMS), via either ground or air transport.  
Patients on life support may need to be placed on alternate, portable ventilation machines, 
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and other equipment.  The change in equipment can drastically affect the status of these 
patients.   
Conceivably, a healthcare facility could declare an evacuation, or begin early 
discharges, with advanced warning preceding a disaster event.  Pre-evacuation occurred 
prior to Hurricane Irene by three hospitals of the Northshore-Long Island Jewish Health 
System in New York in 2011 (Verni, 2012).  The evacuation was generally considered 
successful, in that patients were safely evacuated in a timely manner to appropriate 
facilities. 
How to best employ the evacuation of a hospital is an area that has recently seen 
improved research to demonstrate the methods necessary to complete such a complex 
task.  Bish, Agra, and Glick (2014) presented a model that evaluated patient needs against 
vehicle transport types and accepting facilities.  However, the modeling made several 
assumptions which are difficult to equate into a practical model that is occurring during 
catastrophic events.  Assumptions included readily-available ambulance transport, fixed 
load, and precise transport times.  The model provided by Bish et al. (2014), built on a 
previous model by Childers (2010), considered the patients’ needs, but did not consider 
transportation and facility availability.  Other studies have focused upon which resources 
(e.g., transportation vehicles, staff) to determine appropriate transportation requirements 
based on patient needs (Taaffe, Johnson, & Steinmann, 2006; Tayfur & Taaffe, 2007).  In 
the last several years, increasing amounts of research have been published detailing how 
to accomplish hospital evacuation. However, gaps in the literature remain regarding 
precise conditions that necessitate an evacuation. 
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Water Supply Systems 
A hospital cannot effectively continue operational processes without water.  The 
JCAHO reported that hospitals should be prepared to continue services for 48-72 hours 
following a disaster event without any outside assistance (JCAHO, 2003).  Ideally, 
hospitals will be able to return to normal supply routines or identify alternatives within 
the 48 to 72-hour window.  Once the plumbing is compromised, the piping is out of 
service until properly sanitized.  To fulfill the need, hospitals must maintain an adequate 
supply of water without counting on water that is remaining in the pipes following a 
compromise.  There may be ways to ration water to certain vital areas through a greater 
understanding of general needs.   
Food and water.  The most basic need of water is for hydration.  The lower limit 
of water necessary for hydration purposes is one gallon per person daily (Butcher, 2006).  
In healthcare facilities, drinking water for emergency events is often stored in bottled 
water form.  Bottled water can be purchased and stocked in individual bottles, gallon 
containers, or multi-gallon containers.  Bottled water supplies can have several other uses 
as well.  Besides hydration purposes, water is also used in healthcare facilities for food 
preparation.  Most hospitals have kitchen facilities and dining areas in-house.  Water is 
necessary for a variety of functions of food preparation processes. 
Sanitation and sterilization.  Cleanliness is a crucial function of healthcare 
facilities.  Cleaning duties are most often performed through sanitation procedures.  
Cleanliness is defined as the removal of dirtiness, while disinfection is the eradication of 
microorganisms (Mazzola, Jozala, Novaes, Moriel, & Pena, 2009).  Common sanitation 
practices utilize chemical disinfectants diluted with water.  Chemical disinfectants can be 
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applied via spray, as well as handwashing techniques (Saad, 2007).  Disinfectants are 
widely used due to their cost-effectiveness but do not remove all microorganisms.  Hand-
washing has a long-established tradition in healthcare facilities for the prevention of 
Healthcare-Associated Infections (HAIs) (Ellingson et al., 2014).  Most hospitals have 
policies that require hand washing procedures at multiple steps in the patient care 
continuum.  Hand washing can be performed with traditional soap and water, as well as 
with alcohol-based sanitizers.  Alcohol-based sanitizers decrease the risk of HAIs and 
have proven to be cost-effective (Chen et al., 2011).  HAIs are incrementally more 
frequent in developing countries lacking these practices (Bennett et al., 2015).  A 
combination of traditional hand-washing coupled with the use of alcohol-based sanitizers 
is common practice in healthcare facilities to prevent the spread of infection.  Checks and 
balances are used to ensure proper sanitation of the water supply and handwashing 
techniques. 
Sterilization in the hospital setting is the most effective technology for the 
removal of microbes.  Mazzola et al. (2009) defined sterilization as the complete 
destruction of microorganisms.  Steam sterilization, also known as autoclaving, is the 
commonly accepted method.  Autoclaving requires a combination of water heated to 
steam mixed with chemical disinfectants for optimum sterilization (Jabbari et al., 2012).  
Autoclave sterilization is heavily dependent upon water and electricity usage. 
Medical functions.  A large array of medical functions, including various 
treatments and diagnostic testing procedures, are dependent upon water supply.  
Diagnostic tests that rely on water supply include x-ray machines, computer 
topographical tests, and certain lab procedures (Welter et al., 2010).  Diagnostic testing 
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does not require intensive amounts of water.  However, water is necessary for the cooling 
processes of some non-invasive testing procedures. 
Many medical treatments require a clean water supply to varying degrees.  
Dialysis is a life-saving treatment for patients with renal failure.  Dialysis treatment 
requires intensive amounts of water.  Dialysis is administered through a compound 
named Dialysate.  A typical dialysis schedule requires 576 liters (152 gallons) of 
Dialysate weekly (Ward, 2005).  Dialysate is composed primarily of water combined 
with concentrates of calcium, magnesium, potassium, and sodium.  IV fluids are also 
primarily composed of water along with other components.  Normal Saline, .9% Sodium 
Chloride, is also diluted with water, which in turn is used to dilute many other 
medications.  It is paramount that clean water is used in Normal Saline and Dialysate 
compounds as contaminants can be detrimental to patients with vulnerable renal or 
immune systems.  
Heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning.  Structural ventilation is performed 
constantly with Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) machines in 
healthcare facilities.  Water is needed for cooling processes of many HVAC systems.  
Several organizations provided input in the guidance of design and construction of 
ventilation systems for healthcare facilities.  These groups include American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI), American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-
conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), and the ASHE.  Together they formed standards and 
regulations known as ANSI/ ASHRAE/ ASHE 170 (Ninomura & Hermans, 2008).  It is 
important that the ventilation processes are able to provide controlled airflow in operating 
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and isolation rooms.  Some newer HVAC models are water-free. However, older model 
HVACs are water cooled. 
Sewerage systems.  Excreta are the opposite of clean water supply.  Excreta are 
generally removed through sewerage systems which are maintained by municipal 
services.  Municipal providers are generally responsible for maintaining the external 
aspects of sewerage systems.  Sewerage back-up creates an atmosphere of poor hygiene 
and sanitation, leading to increased incidents of diarrhea, malaria, and other 
communicable diseases (Noji, 2005a, 2005b).  Sewerage systems do not require a clean 
water supply to remove excreta.  Non-potable water is acceptable to use for excreta 
removal. 
Other hospital systems.  Various other hospital functions are dependent upon 
water supply.  Fire-fighting capabilities are an essential tool in the event of emergency.  
The ability to internally prevent fire damage is vital when emergency services are 
deployed elsewhere, such as in an emergency situation.  Portable fire extinguishers are an 
alternative.  Portable fire extinguishers are not a complete defense for the protection of 
healthcare facilities. 
Water is also needed for laundry services.  Low energy and low-water use 
washing machines are commercially available and becoming increasingly more common.  
New technological advances have made water-recycled laundry equipment an option as 
well.  Water-recycled laundry services are not a standard practice in hospitals.  There is a 
notable absence of scientific literature to explain the importance and alternatives in 
regards to the water supply used for fire-fighting and laundry services in healthcare 
facilities. 
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Infrastructure interdependency.  It is important to note how many of the critical 
systems in healthcare infrastructure relate to each other.  For example, computer systems 
are powered by electrical systems and electricity production relies on water systems for 
cooling purposes.  Zimmerman et al. (2005) classified four critical infrastructure systems: 
electricity, water, telecommunication, and transportation.  These systems are vulnerable 
to cascading and sequential uncertainties as defined by Schultz and Koenig (2006).  The 
interrelation of systems creates dependency which could exacerbate a disruption that 
occurs within any one system at the wrong moment (Arbodela et al., 2006).  Hanada, 
Itoga, Takano, and Kudou (2007) demonstrated how temporary losses of electricity could 
negatively affect vital healthcare equipment.  A loss of power could impact life support 
equipment by resetting devices and returning them to default settings.  The 
interdependency of critical infrastructure systems increases the vulnerability of healthcare 
facilities and highlights the importance of maintaining critical operations.  
Review of water needs.  Water supply in healthcare facilities is a complex 
system with multiple needs for a variety of processes.  Dialysate can be stored in 5-gallon 
containers. Bottled water can be stored for food and water.  Non-potable water is 
adequate for laundry, fire-fighting, ventilation, and electricity generation can be stored 
separately from potable supplies.  The different requirements for water creates the need 
for a multi-faceted system where water is stored separately depending on use and 
container options, such as IV bags for IV fluids, bottled water for hydration, and reservoir 
for laundry purposes.  These diverse supplies are then delivered through various means 
for specific processes.   
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Water Supply Storage 
Emergency water supplies can be maintained in healthcare facilities through a 
variety of storage options.  The U.S. Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH), Center 
for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention (CDC, 2012) offers general guidance for 
available storage mediums.  Options available for water storage include reservoirs, 
bladder -type containers, and bottled water.  It may be acceptable to use non-potable 
water to perform many functions in healthcare facilities, such as laundry, fire-fighting 
capabilities, and sewerage removal.  Utilizing non-potable water sources may not be 
feasible for certain facilities. The plumbing systems of hospitals are not generally capable 
of separating and diverting potable and non-potable water.  
Examination of current practices sheds more light on actual preparedness 
measures.  An audit performed by Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center 
(LSUHSC, 2007) reported that the Shreveport facility uses 28,000 gallons of water daily.  
LSUHSC-Shreveport maintained 17,000 gallons of water for emergency purposes.  The 
emergency water supply available to LSUHSC-Shreveport represented an eight to ten-
hour supply.  The audit shows a drastic disconnect between JCAHO recommendations 
and actual practices.  LSUHSC’s plan for water supply failure also included requesting 
the assistance from the State of Louisiana, Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP).  
Limited research is available explaining practical trends of current emergency 
water supply storage.  Saad (2007) described several hospitals in Egypt that utilized 
storage tanks.  The review of case studies as previously noted often shows a strict 
reliance on bottled water supply (Brevard et al., 2008; Butcher, 2006) or delivery by third 
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party contractor in the aftermath of disaster (Kloc, 2014; Ramsey, 1994).  It is quite 
possible, most likely probable, that multiple hospitals are contracting with the same third 
party vendors to supply water in the event of an emergency.   
Contracting with the same vendors can create an over-reliance on one contractor, 
or a select few, to provide water supply to multiple regional hospitals following a disaster 
event.  Resupply in the aftermath of a disaster relies on the assumption that transportation 
routes and supply chains remain intact.  Bottled water supply is acceptable for certain 
purposes, but it is difficult for a healthcare facility to maintain a supply of bottled water 
capable of fully servicing the facility for up to three days. 
Issues with bottled water.  Bottled water is generally labeled with an expiration 
date.  However, according to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), water does not 
expire (Posnick & Kim, 2002).  An early study by Hunter and Bruges (1987) tested 
bottled water and found minute amounts of bacteria and ph above advertised levels.  The 
bacteria and ph levels remained below FDA thresholds.  This research examined mineral 
waters prior to bottling and did not consider the changes to the water product post 
bottling.  More recent studies have begun to look at how storage affects bottled water.  In 
2006, a study by Shotyk, Krachler, and Chen found high levels of the metal antimony, 
Sb2S3, in bottled water.  This study did not specifically address storage but led to further 
research.  In 2007, Shotyk and Krachler noted leaching of antimony with prolonged 
storage.  The findings did not exceed FDA regulations, but they did prove that leaching 
of the properties of the polyethylene terephthalate (PET) bottles was occurring 
continuously.  Greifenstein, White, Stubner, Hout, and Whelton (2013) performed similar 
research which examined various storage climates.  Their study focused on long-term 
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storage of bottled water in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Greifenstein et al. (2013) found that ph, 
odor quality, and antimony of bottled water increased with prolonged storage in extreme 
environments.  The ph level and odor levels exceeded FDA recommendation, while 
antimony remained under FDA levels and was only detected after 28 days at 60°C.  The 
various studies do not expose a lethal risk, but they do explain why bottled water cannot 
be maintained in storage indefinitely.  Concerns also apply to reservoir water. 
Reservoir water considerations.  Reservoirs store large volumes of water.  In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many facilities in Southeast Louisiana moved to install 
well-bore emergency water supply infrastructure.  Supply of water via well-bore is not 
economically feasible in all locations, though, due to geography and depth of aquifers.  
The use of water wells (when possible) or storage reservoirs is an effective way to 
maintain large volumes of water.  However, reservoirs are not generally utilized by 
healthcare facilities.   
Reservoir water must constantly be cycled and periodically cleaned and sanitized.  
Microorganisms will grow in the reservoir if the water is not periodically cycled (Casini 
et al., 2014).  Hot water should be stored at a temperature of at least 140ºF; and hot water 
pipes should maintain a recirculating temperature of 122ºF to inhibit the growth of 
Legionella bacteria (Fathers, 2004).  Reservoir maintenance requirements should not 
preclude healthcare facilities from considering reservoirs.  Further, there is an 
opportunity for healthcare facilities to work with local municipal water services to 
provide the necessary infrastructure for emergency water needs. 
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Summary  
There are many needs for water to maintain the continuity of operations in 
healthcare facilities.  Several water storage options are available for healthcare facilities 
that can be used routinely or strictly for emergency events.  The results of interruption to 
the water supply for healthcare facilities are catastrophic for the organization as well as 
the community.  Hospital standards call for the capacity to operate 48-72 hours without 
assistance (JCAHO, 2003).  The practices of healthcare facilities relating to emergency 
water supply may not fully address the situations that a hospital can encounter in the 
event of an emergency.  An over-reliance on bottled water (Welter et al., 2010) and the 
expectation for increased numbers of patients in the aftermath of disaster (Al-Kattan & 
Abboud, 2009; Bolut et al., 2005; Hick et al., 2009) complicates preparation of an 
emergency water supply.   
Previous research has provided differing recommendations regarding optimal 
water requirements needed in extreme conditions.  Butcher (2006) recommended one 
gallon of water per day, per person, including staff.  The one-gallon recommendation 
should be utilized only for survival needs of hydration purposes only.  Noji (2005b) 
estimated fifteen to twenty liters (four to five gallons) of clean water per person daily.  
Noji’s recommendation is interesting as clean water excludes non-potable needs.  Gleick 
(1996) advised that each person should be allotted fifty liters of water per day, a little 
more than thirteen gallons.  All water uses are figured into the fifty-liter recommendation, 
including bathing, sanitation, hygiene, and food preparation.  However, Gleick’s (1996) 
study included sub-categories for bathing and sanitation/ hygiene.  In the sanitation 
category, a considerable amount of water resources is devoted to laundry services.  In 
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total, Gleick (1996) recommended fifteen liters per person per day (l/p/d) for bathing and 
twenty l/p/d sanitation/ hygiene purposes.  Gleick’s (1996) recommendation is 
comparable with Noji’s (2005b) reference of fifteen to twenty l/p/d, when excluding 
bathing and laundry uses.  
Due to discrepancies in needs versus capabilities, some studies called for a more 
robust supply through planning for up to 96 hours of stand-alone capabilities for 
healthcare facilities (Hick et al., 2009; Welter et al., 2010).  Calling for the additional 
supply capacity recognizes the inadequate resources available for emergency events.  A 
96-hour recommendation errs on the side of caution, considering the importance of 
healthcare facilities to the community, especially in disaster response and recovery 
functions. 
Healthcare facilities have many considerations to take into account, including 
financial pressure.  Funding for disaster preparedness is a delicate issue which is 
generally insufficient (Cherry & Trainer, 2008).  Further analysis by DeLorenzo (2007), 
reported that funding for hospital preparedness is often generated through general tax 
revenues.  Communities are dependent on healthcare facilities for medical services, as 
well as employment opportunities (Zimmerman et al., 2005).  The economic benefits of a 
large employer, such as a hospital, are a crucial component of the recovery process in the 
aftermath of disasters. 
The literature review shows that studies specific to the hospital water supply 
infrastructure for catastrophic situations are limited.  Research on the preparedness of 
healthcare facilities has not always addressed the full range of needs required for 
comprehensive emergency preparedness.  Current research is lacking in practical and 
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theoretical ideas regarding how to provide adequate amounts of water to healthcare 
facilities following a disaster.  Fully understanding the phenomenon of the emergency 
water supply can help to further develop comprehensive hospital preparedness.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
The purpose of this sequential, explanatory mixed methods research is to explore 
the capabilities of healthcare facilities regarding water supply during emergency events.  
Hospitals continuously require water to provide services.  The water supply needs in 
healthcare facilities extend into the time of emergency events.  The research design is 
meant to recognize common themes and future research opportunities relating to the topic 
of emergency water supply in healthcare facilities.   
The literature review shows the wide variety of water needs within hospitals and 
the vulnerability of the infrastructure of healthcare facilities to disaster events.  
Regulatory agencies, such as the JCAHO, require healthcare facilities to be prepared for 
interruption in traditional services and supply processes.  The literature review shows 
gaps in preparedness and how hospitals have difficulty providing water resources when 
the traditional water supply is disrupted.  
The first phase of the research included collecting quantitative data focused on 
internal variables describing regular water usage and capabilities that would affect an 
emergency event.  The following phase consisted of qualitative interviews with those 
responsible for the emergency water supply of healthcare facilities.  The interviews 
provided an in-depth explanation of how hospitals would react in the event of an 
emergency to provide water resources to patients and hospital staff. 
Research Design 
The initial design of the research was based on a quantitative approach.  The plan 
consisted of surveys administered to the facility operators of healthcare facilities.  The 
results of the surveys would then be cross-checked with hospital audit records.  However, 
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it was found that JCAHO audits are performed with a self-designated letter grade system.  
The JCAHO recognizes six essential preparedness components: communication, 
resources, safety/ security, staff, utilities, and clinical/ support services (The Joint 
Commission, 2016).  The six components are then separated into subsections.  Periodic 
reviews of systems are administered via the Hazard Vulnerability Assessment (HVA) and 
the facility assigns a letter grade for the result.  A satisfactory grade would report the 
facility has met mandated standards for the appropriate section.  An unsatisfactory grade 
would demand the facility make appropriate adjustments followed by reevaluation. 
The self-designated letter grade system proved unrealistic to provide quantitative 
data for analytic techniques.  Further, an absolute grade system did not fully represent the 
various contexts of water preparation, storage, and utilization.  Therefore, an alternate 
means of inspection was developed in a mixed methods approach.  As the study 
concerned the human subject, an application was submitted to the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) at Arkansas Tech University (ATU) with a design for the Informed Consent 
(IC) paperwork and research instrument.  The IRB application was subsequently 
approved in September 2016. 
The mixed methods research design enabled the researcher to fully understand the 
needs and capabilities of hospitals regarding their water supply.  The approach required a 
combination of data collection and interview results performed in an explanatory 
sequential order as described by Cresswell (2014).  The quantitative portion allows for 
confirmation or refutation of a theory or hypothesis.  The qualitative section permits 
exploration and discovery. 
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The quantitative data was collected through the use of an internet-based, cross-
sectional survey.  The survey was created on the web platform QuestionPro.  QuestionPro 
is known as an economic, user-friendly toolkit and allows for rapid generation, 
collection, and analysis of results.  The core survey items explicitly addressed the 
dependent variable (average water usage), the independent variable (total water capacity), 
and moderating variables to determine hospital’s preparedness for emergency events 
regarding water supplies.  
Shift in research design.   Limited survey responses necessitated a shift in 
methods further along in the data collection process.  A decision was made to prioritize 
the qualitative data according to an outline provided by Morgan (1998).  This qualitative 
approach allowed for complementing the limited amount of quantitative data and further 
understanding the decision-making process in emergency events.  A similar shift in 
research design was adopted by McGraw, Zvonkovic, and Walker (2000).  McGraw et al. 
(2000) recognized that limited amounts of survey respondents compromised the validity 
of their study.  The authors then utilized their quantitative results to select a subsample of 
the initial target population and to prioritize the qualitative results.  The example set by 
McGraw et al. (2000) thus served as a template for the approach to this thesis. 
The second phase of the research design was qualitative.  This section included 
in-depth interviews that delved into internal and external factors found to affect the needs 
and capabilities of healthcare facilities in relation to water supply.  Recognizing the 
sequence and priority is the starting point to begin a mixed methods research project.  A 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods can complement each other, and thus 
provide a more robust analysis (Green, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989).  The mixed methods 
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approach is especially useful when many factors can influence the dependent variable 
(Morgan, 1998).  The multiple ways water is used in hospitals and the variety of storage 
mediums are consistent with a design needed to explore complex factors. 
Figure 1. shows how qualitative data analysis progressed in six steps as 
recommended by Cresswell (2014). This analysis flow was adopted for the study. 
 
Figure 1. Validating qualitative results (Cresswell, 2014) 
An additional benefit of the research design which was utilized is the ability to 
compare and contrast the preparedness processes of two functionally different facilities: 
urban and rural.  The capabilities of both the facilities represent a microcosm of changes 
that have gradually been occurring in the healthcare industry for the last several decades.  
Physicians have been slowly congregating towards network-centered practices.  Large 
health systems have begun to dominate the healthcare market (Ricketts, 2000).  Rural 
providers have limited capabilities due to increasing costs and decreasing 
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reimbursements, while at the same time having difficulty recruiting and maintaining staff 
and specialist physicians (Ricketts, 2000).  However, the importance of the hospital to the 
local, rural community cannot be understated.  Rural hospitals are often located in areas 
susceptible to natural and environmental hazards (Edwards, Kang, & Silenas, 2008) and 
have a significant impact on the local economy (Mandich & Dorfman, 2014; Zimmerman 
et al., 2005).  Despite the challenges, rural hospitals comprise 1,829 facilities out of a 
total of 5,564 in the United States (AHA, 2017).  Rural hospitals remain a mainstay of the 
American healthcare environment nowadays and in the near future. 
The Quantitative Phase  
The goal of the quantitative phase of the research was to identify and confirm 
areas requiring further reflection.  The quantitative data was collected using an internet-
based, cross-sectional survey (Cresswell, 2014), that was self-developed on the web 
platform QuestionPro.  The principal survey questions addressed the dependent variable 
(average water usage) and independent variable (total water capacity) for use as 
predictors to determine how a hospital prepares for and responds to emergency events 
regarding water supply disruption.  The survey then considered several moderating 
variables to further delineate needs or separate capacity mediums.  Finally, the survey 
allowed respondents to utilize an open-ended question to describe if alternative plans 
were in place for the acquisition of water resources.  
The criteria for selecting participants was contingent on locating and soliciting 
those responsible for the emergency water supply of healthcare facilities.  As such, the 
sampling for the quantitative portion was convenience in nature.  The facility manager of 
the hospital is considered the most knowledgeable regarding the water supply capacity.  
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Some institutions may place control of the water supply under different departments and 
different personnel.  An attempt was made to distribute quantitative cross-sectional 
surveys to the facility managers (or appropriate personnel) of twenty healthcare facilities 
across Louisiana.  Solicitation was made to the targeted healthcare facilities through e-
mail or phone call.  An explanation of the research as outlined in the IRB application was 
then provided for those facilities that returned contact.  The research was then explained 
to those in charge of the emergency water supply, as well as a copy of the IC form and a 
web link to the research instrument.  The initial attempt to contact twenty healthcare 
facilities led to insufficient survey respondents.  The survey population was thus 
increased to fifty healthcare facilities in Louisiana.  A total of five respondents completed 
the research instrument. 
The limited number of respondents would not warrant the significance of the 
quantitative analysis.  To fill the gap of the dataset and explore the context of responses, 
the study was further extended to the qualitative section.  Focusing on qualitative 
inspection is consistent with many mixed methods research approaches from other 
disciplines.  According to Clark, Huddleston-Casas, Churchill, Green, and Garrett (2008), 
“many studies reported only rudimentary analytic techniques, such as reporting 
percentages and means for the quantitative data” (p. 1561).  The quantitative analysis of 
the research design was utilized to recognize core competencies of the survey 
populations.  The quantitative data may be briefly discussed and used for reliability and 
verification. 
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The Qualitative Phase 
The data collected from the quantitative section showed clear differences in the 
needs and capabilities of urban hospitals compared to their rural counterparts.  The 
amounts of water used on a daily basis and stored for emergency purposes was markedly 
greater for the urban facilities.  From the five survey respondents, three represented rural 
hospitals while the other two hospitals were in an urban setting.  Interviews were set up 
with those responsible for the emergency water supply at two hospitals.  For the 
qualitative phase, participants were purposively selected from each of the two groups, 
rural and urban.  
A telephone interview was conducted with the Emergency Preparedness 
Coordinator for Ochsner Medical Center (OMC) in Jefferson, LA.  A face-to-face 
interview was also conducted with the Facility Supervisor for Our Lady of the Sea 
General Hospital (OLOSGH) in Galliano, LA.  Interviews were conducted by recording 
handwritten notes and then immediately transcribing verbatim.  The information 
collected was then transcribed and coded according to common themes.  Finally, I 
combined major findings, such as direct quotes, in table format. 
The choices of these two respondents represented a wide disparity of hospital 
capabilities.  OMC is a fully-functioning, Level 2 trauma center in Jefferson Parish, 
Louisiana, capable of admitting nearly 500 patients.  A gradual shift has been occurring 
in the healthcare delivery system over the last several decades leading to networks of 
increasing numbers physicians and sizes healthcare facilities.  OMC is the center of a 
large healthcare conglomerate in Southeast Louisiana, termed Ochsner Health System 
which includes over thirty hospitals and 2,700 physicians (Ochsner, 2014). 
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OLOSGH is a rural hospital in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana.  OLOSGH has 
general surgery availability, no further specialty care services, and can accommodate less 
than fifty patients.  The US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (2016) defines rural hospitals in several categories, 
including Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs).  CAHs provide around-the-clock emergency 
care in rural areas and have twenty-five or fewer inpatient beds. 
The capabilities of the hospitals selected for the qualitative portion are extremely 
diverse.  The research design is intended to provide an investigation of the preparedness 
trends regarding the water supply for emergency purposes.  Interview and survey results 
are presented in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Four: Results 
As stated in Chapter Three, the need of healthcare facilities in contrast to the 
capabilities is a prominent theme.  Needs are described as water used, and can further be 
broken down into subgroups, such as how much water is needed for a particular action or 
process.  Capabilities can be considered ways that water can be stored or delivered.  In 
general, needs, and capabilities can be described on a daily basis, during normal 
operations.  
The overall needs of healthcare facilities must be understood before separating 
into sub-groups.  OMC used between 5,000 and 10,000 gallons of water on a daily basis. 
OLOSGH reports less than 5,000 gallons of water used daily.  Neither facility had 
significant reservoir or storage capability.  Preparedness planning for water supply 
interruption at OMC was robust, as shown in the statement in Table 1. 
Table 1  
Responses to Emergency Water Supplies 
 
Question OMC OLOSGH 
Explain the activities the 
hospital would take in the 
event of an emergency. 
“A lot stems around 
facilities. We have two 
water wells…They are able 
to provide non-potable 
water.” 
“We will fill up storage 
containers and place a few 
of those in the 
hallways…They are sixty-
gallon containers…We 
could use this to flush 
toilets, etc.” 
 
The planning process to construct the water wells at OMC began following 
Hurricane Katrina.  This infrastructure was federally-funded and distributed by state 
agencies (LRA, 2009).  It is interesting to note that the water wells were only capable of 
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providing a non-potable water supply.  In contrast, the planning process at OLOSGH was 
heavily dependent on municipal water supplies as evidenced by the response in Table 2.  
Sixty-gallon containers allowed the facility to have a minimal supply capacity.  The 
storage containers were utilized in an ad hoc manner.  The containers could only be 
utilized if they were filled prior to compromise of the municipal water supply. 
Table 2  
Responses to Water Supply Capabilities Change 
 
Question OMC OLOSGH 
How would capabilities 
change with advanced 
warning? 
“Facility services handles 
this. They can shut the ice 
machines down to save the 
reserves that are in the 
system. The gallons are 
brought in from an 
alternate location. We can 
also stock up with extra 
gallons and liters.” 
“First, we bring in extra 
bottled water, then fill the 
containers. The hospital 
would probably try to 
discharge or transfer as 
many patients as possible.” 
 
OMC and OLOSGH are located in areas particularly vulnerable to tropical storms 
and hurricane events.  Both facilities had repeated instances of emergency situations in 
the recent past, including Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Gustav.  
OMC was one of the few hospitals that remained open and accepting new patients during 
Hurricane Katrina and subsequent flooding of the greater New Orleans area.  Both OMC 
and OLOSGH have become accustomed to emergency events with a prior warning as a 
result of previous experiences with hurricanes and other incidents. 
The hospitals present different approaches to disaster preparedness for emergency 
events with prior warnings.  OLOSGH would attempt to evacuate patients, if possible, 
before an impending emergency event.  Transferring patients limits the population that is 
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present and allows for available space to accommodate additional patients which may 
arrive at the facility.  Beyond that, the facility planned to continue critical services and 
prepare additional stocks of water resources through the sixty-gallon containers and 
additional bottled water supplies. 
OMC’s approach was focused on providing additional supplies and conserving 
where possible.  OMC did not express any plans to evacuate their patients unless 
necessary.  Following Hurricane Katrina, OMC, which did not flood, provided 45,000 
bottles of water or bottled products to staff members, patients, family, National Guard, 
security agencies, and personnel of various federal agencies (Ginsberg, 2006).  
Conservation measures, such as shutting down ice machines, can limit the needs of the 
facility.  Ice is a luxury during an emergency event, and these resources can be directed 
towards more pertinent uses. 
The actions of OMC following Hurricane Katrina portrayed the operations 
through difficult times.  However, it must be stressed that the well water can be utilized 
for non-potable use only, and planning for potable water supplies is contingent on the use 
of bottled water products. 
Table 3 
 
Responses to Bottled Water Storage 
 
Question OMC OLOSGH 
How much bottled water is 
kept? 
“We usually keep around 
5,000 gallons.” 
“A couple of hundred 
gallons, less than five 
hundred.” 
 
Both OMC’s and OLOSGH’s emergency potable water supply planning was 
centered around the use of bottled water, as explained in Table 3.  Both hospitals planned 
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to increase reserve supply of bottled water in the event of an imminent emergency.  
Neither respondent was concerned with the expiration of bottled water products.  
Ginsberg (2006) noted the use of 45,000 bottles of water product distributed following 
Hurricane Katrina at OMC.  45,000 units of bottled water products represent a significant 
increase over the normal stock levels.  It must be noted that OMC was a location for a 
FEMA medical clinic following Hurricane Katrina.  FEMA may have provided a large 
proportion of the bottled water products.  
Neither OMC nor OLOSGH reported any reservoir capacity.  The water wells at 
OMC did not connect to a storage medium.  The reliance on bottled water for emergency 
preparation was identified.  Further understanding of the expected population at the 
facilities at the time of an emergency event was further investigated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
Table 4  
Responses to Expected Patients and Staff Members 
Question OMC OLOSGH 
What is the average in-
patient admission count? 
“I believe it is around 
380.” 
“Thirteen, I believe.” 
What is the maximum 
amount of patients that the 
hospital can accommodate? 
“Somewhere near 500.” 
“Twenty-five on the floor, 
eight in the emergency 
room, and four in the 
ICU." 
How many employees 
would be at the facility in 
the event of an emergency? 
“800-1200. As low as 500-
1000 on team A.” 
“I would guess twenty-five 
to fifty.” 
 
The population in Table 4 represents the true needs of the facilities during an 
emergency event.  The needs of OLOSGH were a fraction of OMC.  OLOSGH reported a 
maximum occupancy rate of fifty staff members and thirty-seven patients.  The 
occupancy rate was dependent upon the number of patients at the hospital.  It was 
reported in the interview that the hospital “would probably try to discharge or transfer as 
many patients as possible.”  The average patient census on a daily basis was around 
thirteen at OLOSGH.  As such, the expected service population in emergency was closer 
to sixty, which included both staff members and patients. 
OLOSGH’s emergency water supply included about 500 gallons of bottled water.  
60 staff members and patients at OLOSGH would require 237 gallons of water in 25 
hours according to Gleick’s (1996) recommendation.  500 gallons of water would be 
adequate to maintain hydration and other water purposes of OLOSGH for approximately 
48 hours.  The storage containers can be used for non-potable purposes, but these 
supplies will diminish rapidly, and are limited in available applications.   
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OMC expected between 1180 and 1580 patients and staff members present at the 
hospital in the event of an emergency.  The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) 
distinguishes an emergency team (Team A) and a recovery team (Team B).  Team A is 
generally expected to reside within the facility until the danger passed and business 
operations return to a normal state.  Adequate water supplies must be provided to the total 
expected population. 
OMC’s capabilities were less clear.  1000 members on Team A, combined with 
380 average patients would require 5,464 gallons of water at 15 l/p/d levels.  However, 
well water can be utilized for all non-potable purposes.  The non-potable water can be 
used for laundry, showering (not bathing), fire suppression systems, and to be diverted 
for critical infrastructure uses.  OMC’s existing stock of about 5,000 gallons of bottled 
water would not amount to 15 l/p/d for 1,380 staff members and patients over two or 
more days.  Acquisition of potable supplies may be required to maintain facility services 
at OMC. 
Table 5  
Responses to Dialysis Capabilities 
Question OMC OLOSGH 
How would dialysis be 
handled during an 
emergency event? 
“The thing we are not able 
to address well is dialysis. 
They would have to be sent 
out of the system…” 
“That’s all done out-
patient…through the 
clinic.” 
 
Table 5 addresses a particularly difficult area for hospitals in preparation of 
patients with advanced renal needs.  OLOSGH did not report renal services, so the supply 
of dialysate was not an issue in this case.  However, OMC performed in-patient, out-
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patient, and emergency dialysis.  Ward (2005) reported a typical dialysis patient requires 
152 gallons of dialysate per week.  The typical dialysis patient undergoes three dialysis 
treatments per week, equaling about fifty gallons per treatment; an extraordinary number 
that can add up quickly with only a few renal patients.  On average, OMC used between 
250-500 gallons of dialysate daily and stored about 500 gallons of dialysate.  Re-supply 
of dialysate could be complex, requiring delivery from specific suppliers.  OMC 
recognized that the supply of dialysate is inadequate during an emergency event and the 
difficulty of acquiring additional dialysate.   
Table 6 
Responses to Rationing of Water Supplies 
Question OMC OLOSGH 
Are there any plans in 
place regarding rationing 
of water supplies if 
needed? 
“We provide armbands for 
essential personnel. This 
limits the total that we have 
to provide for. We do not 
want to limit 
consumption…But we do 
not want to provide extra, 
unnecessary resources.” 
“I do not know that. I 
imagine administration 
would determine if it came 
to that.” 
 
Neither OMC nor OLOSGH had any significant plans in place to ration water 
resources according to Table 6.  OMC planned to utilize the activation teams.  The 
activation teams limited the amount of employees present.  Limiting the number of 
employees on campus can quantify an estimate that the facility can use to prepare 
adequate resources.  Neither facility had agreements in place to acquire water supplies 
through a third-party vendor. 
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The information provided in interviews is consistent with general trends found in 
the quantitative portion of the research.  The research results are also consistent with 
publicly available material from other hospitals in the region, such as the LSUHSC 
(2007) audit.  LSUHSC–Shreveport maintained an eight to ten-hour supply of readily 
available water with preparations in place for additional spontaneous acquisition.  
According to Welter et al. (2010), many hospitals rely on bottled water for an emergency 
water supply.  Reliance on bottled water is a prominent theme among the results of this 
study.  To truly affect positive preparedness, hospitals should consider the full range of 
needs and a large scale of reserve water supply.  A closer analysis should account for the 
community involvement in the planning of infrastructure, eventually ensuring the 
resilience of healthcare facilities.  
The resources of the two hospitals chosen for this study showed stark differences 
in a variety of areas.  Planning for emergency events is manifested through the extent of 
available resources.  Both hospitals recognized the difficulty in adequately providing for 
their staff members and patients if regular routines were disrupted for an extended 
timeframe.   
OLOSGH has limited capabilities on a routine basis, such as specialty care 
services.  OLOSGH planned to remain open throughout an emergency but transfer 
patients out of the system if possible.  The transfer plan is comparable with the 
evacuation of hospitals in New York prior to Hurricane Irene, as detailed by Verni 
(2012).  Transferring patients also creates additional space in the event of a surge in 
patients following a disaster event.   
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OMC’s preparations were much more robust.  OMC withstood the onslaught of 
Hurricane Katrina and built mitigation infrastructure since then.  The water wells should 
provide salient benefits in a dire situation.  OMC did recognize that dialysis patients may 
need to be transferred, but otherwise was prepared to maintain operations throughout an 
emergency event if possible.  However, the ability to provide potable water for staff 
members and patients for longer than 24 hours is dependent upon acquiring additional 
supplies, either immediately before or during the aftermath of a disaster event.  
The preparedness planning of hospitals entails a wide diversity of needs with 
water supplies comprising one facet.  Both facilities appear to have learned lessons from 
previous disaster events in the region.  These experiences are manifested in the storage of 
resources, pre-planning to acquire additional supplies, and use of activation teams to limit 
populations.  However, the consistent reliance on bottled water to cover water needs, 
especially potable services, remains alarming.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
As stated in Chapter Four, general trends about emergency water supplies were 
recognized during the interview process.  These trends include hospital needs, hospital 
capabilities, opportunities to improvise, and areas that are not adequately covered.  Clear 
differences can be noted regarding the capabilities of urban versus rural hospitals.  The 
hospitals in Southeast Louisiana are in a specific geographic region that is prone to 
natural and technological disasters, especially hurricane events.  This location 
necessitates the regular application of emergency preparedness procedures.  Waeckerle 
(1991) noted deficiencies in disaster preparedness measures among healthcare facilities.  
Wise (2006) found more salient outcomes with prior planning processes, and called for 
“the resources to handle all people who present and at the same time also be able to 
adequately resupply consumed resources” (p. 1151).  Prior planning must consider not 
only immediate needs, but also foresee future needs and gaps in capabilities.  
Organizations should recognize poor preparedness procedures by learning from 
their own previous experiences, as well as the success and failures of like-minded 
organizations.  The hospitals in Southeast Louisiana noticed the plight of other hospitals 
in the region that have been negatively affected by disaster events and adjusted 
accordingly where possible.  Hurricane Katrina was a landmark event that focused the 
world’s attention on Southeast Louisiana.  Vulnerable populations were left in 
undesirable, sometimes dire, situations.  Healthcare facilities were severely impacted.  
Many of the hospitals in the region were unprepared for the catastrophe, as shown by 
Brevard et al. (2008). 
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The literature review showed the diverse needs of water resources within 
healthcare facilities.  The literature review also revealed how a wide variety of events, 
both internal and external, can cause a range of systems failures.  Critical infrastructure 
systems are dependent upon each other (Arbodela et al., 2006; Hanada et al., 2007; 
Schultz & Koenig, 2006), and water supply is a common theme in the continuity of 
operations of healthcare facilities. 
Major Findings   
Rural healthcare facilities, such as OLOSGH, are at a disadvantage for developing 
robust disaster preparedness planning.  Financing is routinely constrained.  The lack of 
funding prohibits preparedness measures which may assist the facility in ensuring a 
stand-alone capacity as recommended by the JCAHO (2003). 
A certain adaptive capacity can be noted in the preparedness planning of the 
hospitals included in the research.  In systems management, adaptive capacity can explain 
responses to changes in the external environment or recovery when changes affect 
internal processes (Dalziell & McManus, 2004).  Systems change can occur by utilizing 
existing resources, new applications for existing resources, or by creating new response 
mechanisms. 
Existing resources are utilized in OLOSGH emergency preparations plan.  
Transferring patients out of the hospital system is an action that occurs on a regular basis. 
OLOSGH is a rural hospital that does not have many specializations, such as 
cardiovascular, neurological, etc.  Patients requiring advanced levels of care must be 
routinely transferred to appropriate, alternate facilities.  The decision to enhance 
movement of these patients out of the hospital system following advanced warning of an 
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impending disaster event shows recognition of limited hospital services and resources.  
The implementation of storage containers to increase water supply is also an example of 
utilization of existing resources.  However, the use of this type of storage medium in a 
healthcare facility is inconsistent with acceptable water sanitation practices.  
Both OLOSGH and OMC’s ability to allocate water during an emergency event is 
based on limiting personnel.  OLOSGH’s plan to deliver water resources through an 
emergency event is contingent upon provision of bottled water combined with 
maintaining small patient and staff counts.  Limiting patient census numbers may be 
possible with advanced warning by discharging or transferring patients.  However, the 
hospital may easily be left in an undesirable position following a sudden, unexpected 
event. 
Robust preparedness measures at OMC are consistent with the additional capacity 
available to urban facilities.  OMC is the center of a large hospital network with 
significantly greater resources than its smaller competitors.  OMC’s emergency 
preparedness plans show a much wider range of adaptive capacity.   
The use of emergency activation teams is a well-practiced response.  The teams 
are separated to give each other adequate recovery time.  Assigning team members entry/ 
exit armbands is a new application of previous resources.  Limiting the number of staff 
members present also lessens the amount of resources necessary to maintain the facility.  
Dialysis is an area of significant concern for renal patients following a disaster event.  
OMC must transfer renal patients out of their system only in the event of an emergency, 
primarily due to dwindling supply of dialysate.  Finally, the drilling of water wells is a 
novel response implemented to address a recognized shortage.  
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Solutions and Future Directions 
In order to gain a greater understanding of the issue of the emergency water 
supply of healthcare facilities it will be necessary to provide a wider scale of research.  
This research project comprises a unique locale that had recently been severely affected 
by Hurricane Katrina.  The hospitals in this study, especially OMC, have made 
considerable updates to their emergency preparedness capabilities since that time.  The 
use of water wells is one example of structural upgrades to OMC’s emergency 
preparedness planning.  However, the use of well water may not be feasible for all 
geographic regions. 
The cost of water wells increases in environments with elevated topographical 
features.  A greater understanding must be gained of the cost-benefit of various types of 
storage mediums.  Cost-benefit modeling can help individual hospitals recognize specific 
alternatives that best fit their environment.  Effective cost-benefit analysis of the water 
supply of healthcare facilities can only occur with the assistance of multiple departments 
within hospital administration. 
Finally, it must be understood that it may not be possible to prepare for every 
situation or to provide indefinite resources in the event of certain disasters.  In these 
cases, it is important to make effective use of all resources.  Some uses of the water 
supply that are necessary on a daily basis may possibly be temporarily withheld in 
emergency situations.  Rationing can include delaying processes, such as laundry 
services.  Rationing does not need to strictly be defined as withholding resources.  
Computer algorithms can provide modeling features to explain how water resources can 
be diverted for the most pertinent uses. 
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Synergies can be considered that may have alternate daily functions but are able 
to provide emergency capacity.  An example would include a swimming pool that is used 
for physical therapy.  The water in the swimming pool can be used as a storage reservoir 
and diverted for use when necessary.  An elevated swimming pool, such as on a rooftop, 
can also provide adequate water pressure. 
Finally, community preparedness forums offer one of the greatest opportunities to 
enact positive improvement to policy initiatives on the local level.  The presence of 
healthcare facilities is beneficial to communities both economically and for medical 
services (Mandich & Dorfman, 2014; Zimmerman et al., 2005).  Community 
preparedness coalitions need to recognize the limitations of the water supply in healthcare 
facilities and the consequences of inadequate supply to vulnerable populations.  
Stakeholders involved in community preparedness coalitions include organizations and 
individuals in position to provide water supply initiatives, such as public works, critical 
infrastructure providers, public administrators, along with healthcare organizations 
(JCAHO, 2005).  Collaboration between these key stakeholders should prioritize access 
of water supplies to healthcare facilities during extreme events.  Water towers or 
reservoirs should be built on or near hospital grounds.  Close access could ensure that 
water supply be diverted to hospitals in the event of catastrophe.  A dedicated storage 
medium could ensure that water supplies are diversified, with bottled water adding to 
reserves.  A water tower in close proximity seems to be an ideal solution that can assist 
healthcare facilities in providing for vulnerable populations. 
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